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I. COURT DENIES COUNTIES OPPORTUNITY TO CONTEST
REASONABLENESS OF INDIGENT CAPITAL DEFENDANT'S
INVESTIGATIVE AND EXPERT FEES
In Ex parte Lexington County' the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that a county does not have standing to participate in statutory ex parte
hearings to determine the reasonableness of investigative and expert services
required for representation of indigent capital murder defendants. 2 Because
counties currently have potentially unlimited financial liability to provide
attorneys' fees and expert costs in such cases, this decision has the potential
to generate interest among concerned citizens and local officials throughout the
state.3 In order to fully understand the significance of this decision, it is
necessary to first examine the legislative history of South Carolina Code
section 16-3-264 and a related case, Bailey v. State.5
Prior to 1977, under the predecessor of current section 16-3-26, attorneys
representing indigent defendants in capital murder cases were limited to $750
in fees plus necessary expenses approved by a trial judge.6 In 1977 the South
Carolina General Assembly increased the limit on attorneys' fees to $1,500
and established a $2,000 limit on investigative and expert services.7 It also
required that requests for investigative and expert services be presented ex
parte. s Although the General Assembly did not specify which governmental
entity was to pay for investigative and expert funds, it did specify that
attorneys' fees were to be paid by "[tihe county in which the indictment was
1. __ S.C. __, 442 S.E.2d 589 (1994).
2. Id. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 594.
3. This potential unlimited liability is significant. In one instance, county council members
were so concerned with payment of defense costs for an indigent defendant charged with killing
a police officer that they threatened to sue the solicitor if he continued to seek the death penalty.
One Jasper County attorney was quoted as saying, "We could be picking between killing [the
defendant] and killing innocent people by not having an adequately funded hospital." Lisa
Greene, Death Penalty Becoming a Dollars-And-CentsIssue, Jasper County Can 't Afford Possible
Trial Costs, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 9, 1993 at lB.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1994) (proscribing procedures
for and setting limitations on an indigent capital defendant's requests for attorneys' fees and
investigative and expert costs).
5. 309 S.C. 485, 424 S.E.2d 503 (1992).
6. Act of June 17, 1969, No. 309, §§ 4, 7, 1969 S.C. Acts 374, 375-77 (current version at
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994)).
7. Act of June 8, 1977, No. 177, § 3(B)-(C), 1977 S.C. Acts 407, 411-12 (current version
at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994)).
8. Act of June 8, 1977, No. 177, § 3(C), 1977 S.C. Acts 407, 412.
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returned."' The statute's silence as to the source of investigative and expert
services funding, coupled with its specification that the county pay attorneys'
fees, implied that the state was to pay for investigative and expert costs.
Considering only the express statutory language, a reasonable conclusion was
that the state would pay up to $2,000 of investigative and expert costs for
every indigent capital defendant and that counties would pay only for
attorneys' fees up to the $1,500 limit.
Although not referenced in the statute, the 1977 Annual Appropriations
Act contained a fixed appropriation of state funds for the defense of
indigents."' These funds were allocated to the counties, according to popula-
tion, until exhausted." To address the limitation on state funds, the Appropri-
ations Act further provided that "it is the intent of the General Assembly that
any expense incurred in any county for the defense of indigents in excess of
the county's share of funds appropriated. . . shall be borne by the county." 2
Accordingly, a reading of this provision of the appropriations bill, coupled
with the existence of the $2,000 limit established by the statute, suggested that
expert costs were limited to $2,000 regardless of whether the state or a county
was to pay.
The statute was amended in 1978 to specify that both investigative and
expert costs and attorneys fees would be paid from state "funds appropriated
for the defense of indigents." 13 Unlike the 1977 version, the amended statute
clearly referenced the state appropriation for the defense of indigents contained
in the 1978 Annual Appropriations Act. 4 Like its predecessor, 5 the 1978
Annual Appropriations Act stipulated that a county would be liable if state
funds for that county were exhausted. 6 Given the existence of a clear
statutory reference to the Appropriations Act, it appeared more certain that
there was a limit to what an individual indigent defendant could receive in the
way of defense costs, regardless of whether the state or a county was the
source of the funds.
In Bailey v. State, '7 however, the South Carolina Supreme Court
concluded that section 16-3-26 only limited state liability and provided no
protection to the counties. In so interpreting the statute, the court created
virtually unlimited potential county exposure for indigent capital defense
expenses. The issue before the court was the constitutionality of the statutory
9. Act of June 8, 1977, No. 177, § 3(B), 1977 S.C. Acts 407, 411-12.
10. 1977 Annual Appropriations Act, No. 219, Part I, § 4, 1977 S.C. Acts 564, 582-83.
11. 1977 Annual Appropriations Act, No. 219, Part I, § 4, 1977 S.C. Acts 564, 583.
12. 1977 Annual Appropriations Act, No. 219, Part I, § 4, 1977 S.C. Acts 564, 583.
13. Act of June 30, 1978, No. 555, § 2, 1978 S.C. Acts 1636, 1636-37.
14. 1978 Annual Appropriations Act, No. 644, Part I, § 4, 1978 S.C. Acts 1872, 1896.
15. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
16. 1978 Annual Appropriations Act, No. 644, Part I, § 4, 1978 S.C. Acts 1872, 1898.
17. _ S.C. _, 424 S.E.2d 503 (1992).
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limit on attorneys' fees, which by 1992 had been increased to $5,000.18
Finding $5,000 insufficient to guarantee indigent capital defendants the quality
of legal representation mandated by the United States Supreme Court, the
court stated that the statutory limit did "not provide compensation adequate to
ensure effective assistance of counsel in capital cases." 19 Noting that
legislative acts are presumptively constitutional, the court refused to strike any
limit as unconstitutional, but rather upheld the statute as a limitation on state
funds only.' The court then noted that the counties would be required "to
supplement as required in a given case."21 Bailey thereby set the stage for
three cases of tremendous importance to Lexington County, South Carolina.
In January 1993 Lexington County was ordered to pay more than $65,000
in fees and expenses incurred in the defense of an indigent capital defen-
dant.' Shortly thereafter, Lexington County learned that two capital indigent
defendants, Johnny O'Landis Bennett and Raymond Patterson, Jr., had filed
ex parte motions requesting funds for investigative and expert services.'
Concerned with its potential exposure, Lexington County contended that it was
entitled to participate in the ex parte proceeding and contest the reasonableness
and necessity of expenses for which it would be liable.
At the ex parte hearings, Lexington County argued that section 16-3-
26(C)'s ex parte hearing requirement did not apply to applications for county
funds.2 4 Counsel for Bennett and Patterson protested that Lexington County's
participation was a violation of section 16-3-26(C), which requires an ex parte
hearing for defendants to prove that requested investigative and expert services
"are reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant."1 5 The
defendants maintained that if the proof of reasonable necessity was offered in
the presence of others, elements of their defense strategy would necessarily be
revealed and the defense compromised. Defense counsel argued that county
18. The Omnibus Criminal Justice Improvements Act of 1986, No. 462, § 26, 1986S.C. Acts
2955, 2982-83.
19. Bailey, 309 S.C. at 464, 424 S.E.2d at 508.
20. Id.
21. Id. (citing McMehan v. York County Council, 281 S.C. 249, 315 S.E.2d 127 (Ct. App.
1984)); see also Hardaway v. County of Lexington, _ S.C. _, _, 443 S.E.2d 569, 571
(1994) (acknowledging that the court "created by judicial decision in Bailey a new liability for
counties where none formerly existed").
22. Hardaway, _ S.C. at_, 443 S.E.2d at 570; see also Lisa Greene, Lexington Co. To
Pay $65,000In Death-penaltyDefense Fees, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 21, 1993, at lB.
The supreme court later held that Lexington County was not liable for the expenses because they
had been incurred prior to the Bailey decision. Hardaway, _ S.C. at _, 443 S.E.2d at 571
(limiting Bailey to prospective application).
23. Exparte Lexington County, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 591.
24. Record at 57.
25. SeeExparte Lexington County, -_S.C. at, 442 S.E.2d at 591-92; S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-26(C) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1994).
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participation could result in leaks to the prosecution, jeopardizing the
defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and right to
counsel.26
Relying on Bailey, the trial court held that the county had a right to
contest the reasonableness and the necessity of any expenses for which it
would be liable. In an effort to comply with Bailey, make necessary funds
available to the defendants, and still respect the county's desire to be heard,
the trial judge offered to issue orders on the defendants' requests for funds
outside the county's presence, but noted that such orders would only become
effective as to the county after a hearing in which the county could be
heard.27 The defendants declined this offer, citing a need for the money prior
to trial. Recognizing the novelty of the issue presented, the trial court certified
its ruling for appeal. The South Carolina Supreme Court consolidated both
cases for appeal."
The supreme c6urt declined to consider whether a constitutional right to
an ex parte proceeding exists, 9 but rather approached the issue as one of
statutory interpretation. Section 16-3-26(C) provides that the hearing should
be held ex parte. Noting that an ex parte proceeding is one for the benefit of
only one party,3" the court held that only the defendant could participate in
the ex parte proceeding mandated by the statute and that it would be error to
allow Lexington County to participate.3" This decision overlooked the
inconsistency of applying section 16-3-26's ex parte requirement to counties
while denying counties the protection of section 16-3-26's statutory limits.
Ex parte Lexington County also establishes that all ex parte proceedings
on requests for investigative and expert services will likely be held in camera.
While noting that there is a presumption in favor of open hearings and that the
burden is on the defendant to show cause for closing a hearing, the court
recognized that equal protection considerations32 left "no reasonable alterna-
tives to closure of the ex parte hearing which would protect these defendants'
rights to a fair trial."
33
Because the court found no statutory basis for protection of the counties
financial interests in Bailey and denied counties the opportunity to protect
themselves on a case-by-case basis in Ex parte Lexington County, the counties
26. Exparte Lexington County, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 591-93.
27. Id. at, 442 S.E.2d at 592.
28. Id. at __, 442 S.E.2d at 591.
29. Id. at , 442 S.E.2d at 592.
30. Id. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 593 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 297 (5th ed. 1983)).
31. Exparte Lexington County, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 593.
32. Id. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 594 ("[D]efendants would have to reveal their defenses only
because they are indigent. Any time criminal procedures discriminate against defendants by
reason of their indigent status, such procedures violate the guarantee of equal protection.").
33. Id. at __, 442 S.E.2d at 594.
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continue to find themselves in an unenviable financial position. Since Bailey
the General Assembly has allocated increasing amounts of state revenue to
cover defense costs for indigent capital defendants. In 1993 the General
Assembly appropriated $1,675,000 for the exclusive use of defendants in
capital cases pursuant to section 16-3-26.1' The limit on attorneys' fees was
increased to $25,000,35 and an added provision allowed the fee limit and the
$2,500 limit on investigative and expert services to be exceeded if certified by
a trial court.36 A temporary amendment in 1994 increased the state appropria-
tion to $2,750,000 and raised the limit on expert costs to $20,000.37 Despite
these increases in state funding, counties remain exposed after all allocated
state funds are exhausted.
One potential source of relief could be found in the creation by the
General Assembly of a statutory basis for counties to challenge the reasonable-
ness and necessity of the requested expert services. Such a statutory solution
would not increase the state's financial burden. Although this approach has
equal protection implications,38 procedural mechanisms for providing counties
an opportunity to be heard while protecting a defendant's strategy from
premature disclosure to the solicitor could be included in the statutory
provisions.39 Unless and until the South Carolina General Assembly acts,
34. 1993 Annual Appropriations Act, No. 164, §14.1, 1994 S.C. Acts 531, 619.
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(B) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1994).
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994). This judicial certification
provision may operate to further burden the counties. See Twila Decker, Attorney Wants Judge
to Declare Smith Indigent, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 15, 1995 at 1B (quoting
University of South Carolina School of Law Professor Eldon Wedlock as saying, "If a defense
attorney says [investigative and expert services are] needed and a judge says [they are] not, that
could mean a reversal .... For that reason, judges err on the side of caution and approve
[them].").
37. 1994 Annual Appropriations Act, No. 497, Part IB, § 14.1, 1994 S.C. Acts 5129, 5495,
5497.
38. See Ex parte Lexington County, _ S.C. at _, 442 S.E.2d at 594. Indigent capital
defendants might also assert a constitutional right to an ex parte hearing based upon Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Several state courts have limited the scope and impact of Ake,
either by directing the use of ex parte hearings only in limited circumstances, or by narrowly
defining ex parte. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 385 S.E.2d 81, 83 (Ga. 1989) (finding thatAke did
not clearly mandate an ex parte hearing and directing that the state, because of its financial
interest, be allowed to submit a brief when an ex parte hearing is held), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1018 (1990); State v. Ballard, 428 S.E.2d 178, 180 (N.C.) (finding that an ex parte hearing is
constitutionally required for requests for psychiatric assistance because of the personal nature of
the request), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 487 (1993); State v. Phipps, 418 S.E.2d 178, 190 (N.C.
1992) (stating that although an ex parte hearing "may in fact be the better practice, it is not
always constitutionally required under Ake").
39. Particularly troublesome in this regard would be the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Under the FOIA, anything reported to a county would be subject to a FOIA request, providing
a conduit for potential disclosure of defense trial strategy and thus undermining a defendant's
right to effective assistance of counsel. See Exparte Lexington County, _ S.C. at__ n.5, 442
19951
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counties will continue to have potentially unlimited liability for indigent capital
defense expenses, with no opportunity to contest the reasonableness and
necessity of the investigative and expert expenses to which they are exposed.
Mason A. Goldsmith, Jr.
II. COURT EXAMINES DEFENSE OF INSANITY
AND GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL VERDICT
In State v. Rimert' the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the
affirmative defense of insanity in a murder trial. The court came to several
conclusions. First, while the presumption of sanity does not itself create a jury
issue, once the defense of insanity is raised the State need only present
sufficient evidence of rational thought that cannot be explained by the
circumstances for the issue of sanity to be decided by the jury.2 Second,
courts are not required to instruct a jury about the effects of choosing different
verdicts because such instructions would not aid a jury whose task is limited
to determining whether the defendant has committed the crime.3 Third, the
court interpreted South Carolina Code section 17-24-3Or as requiring a judge
to give a jury a choice between the following verdicts When the defendant has
raised the issue of insanity: (1) guilty, (2) not guilty, (3) not guilty by reason
of insanity, or (4) guilty but mentally ill.5 Lastly, the court found that a
defendant could not waive submission of a guilty but mentally ill verdict to a
jury.6
Rimert was indicted for the murder of his grandparents and two of their
neighbors. He asserted the affirmative defense of insanity. Trial testimony
showed that Rimert, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic, left his medication
at home and traveled south from Indiana7 under the paranoid delusion that an
old girlfriend had been kidnapped and taken to Florida.8 When he arrived in
South Carolina, Rimert went to his grandparents' home in Rock Hill and
S.E.2d at 593 n.5.
1. __ S.C. _, 446 S.E.2d 400 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 730 (1995).
2. Id. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 401.
3. Id. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 401.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
5. Rimert, _ S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 402 (citing State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 413
S.E.2d 19, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 137 (1992)).
6. Id. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 402.
7. Id. at , 446 S.E.2d at 400-01.
8. Record at 90.
[Vol. 47
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss1/6
CRIMiNAL LAW
stabbed his grandparents to death, then walked next door and did the same to
two neighbors. 9
Rimert presented experts who testified that he was under the influence of
paranoid delusions and was incapable of distinguishing between right and
wrong when he committed the acts. 'o The State offered no rebutting experts,
but offered lay testimony that Rimert had cleaned the knife, acted as if he had
done something wrong, and asked a policeman how he could "get out of
this.
"
Rimert moved for a directed verdict, alleging that the preponderance of
evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that he was insane. The trial
judge denied the motion and sent the issue to the jury. The trial judge
permitted the jury to choose from all four options provided by sec-
tion 17-24-301 and did not instruct the jury as to the possible effects of each
verdict on Rimert's sentence.13 The jury returned a verdict of guilty but
mentally ill. 1 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed and found that the trial
court correctly allowed the jury to decide the issue of sanity."
In South Carolina, an accused is presumed to be sane, relieving the State
from having to prove sanity in every case. However, once the accused presents
evidence that suggests insanity, "the presumption [of sanity] disappears and it
is incumbent on the State to present evidence from which a jury could find the
defendant sane. " 16 The State may present this evidence through either lay
testimony or expert testimony, regardless of whether the accused produces
experts.' 7 Based upon these principles of law, the Rimert court concluded that
9. Rimert, _ S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 400.
10. Record at 131-90.
11. Rimert, - S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 401.
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994). The four options are: guilty, not
guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty but mentally ill. Id.
13. Rimert, _ S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 401.
14. Id. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 400.
15. Id. at __,446 S.E.2d at 401.
16. State v. Milian-Hernandez, 289 S.C. 183, 186, 336 S.E.2d 476, 477 (1988).
17. See State v. Smith, 298 S.C. 205, 208-09, 379 S.E.2d 287, 288-89 (1989) (holding lay
testimony sufficient to prove a defendant sane even if the defendant presents expert testimony).
The Rimert court never took issue with whether lay testimony is sufficient to rebut expert
testimony on the issue of sanity, but because the State provided no experts and survived the
directed verdict motions, the sufficiency of such testimony is implicit in the court's holding.
South Carolina courts give greater deference to juries in this situation than many other
jurisdictions. For example, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that while "a factfinder
need not adhere to expert opinion on incompetency if there is reason to discount it ... the jury
cannot arbitrarily ignore the experts in favor of observations of laymen." Ellis v. State, 570 So.
2d 744 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (quoting Strickland v. Francis, 738 F.2d 1542, 1552 (11th Cir.
1984)). In addition, the Alabama court stated that the jury "must have an 'objective reason,' to
disregard the expert's opinion which is rebutted only by lay testimony." Id. at 752 (citing Wallace
v. Kemp, 757 F.2d 1102, 1109 (11th Cir. 1985)).
1995]
7
et al.: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1995
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the evidence of sanity offered by the State could not be easily explained by the
surrounding circumstances and, therefore, Rimert's sanity was a factual issue
to be decided by the jury.'"
The Rimert court's decision is consistent with South Carolina precedent.
State v. Milian-Hernandez9 is the leading case in South Carolina regarding
burdens of proof in insanity defense cases. In Milian-Hernandez the State
provided testimony that would normally be evidence of rational thought, but
because it could be explained by the surrounding circumstances, it was
insufficient to survive a directed verdict. Specifically, the State offered two
pieces of evidence to rebut the testimony of insanity offered by the accused:
(1) the presumption that a defendant is sane, and (2) the fact that the accused
fled the scene. The court first noted that the presumption of sanity disappears
once the accused offers evidence of insanity. The court then held that while
flight is normally evidence of rational thought, the paranoid delusions of
pursuit surrounding the accused's actions were "such as to negate that
permissible inference" normally associated with flight. Hence, although the
state provided testimony of rational thought, because it could be explained by
the surrounding circumstances, it was insufficient to survive a motion for
directed verdict.2'
In Rimert the defendant also argued that the evidence of sanity offered by
the State could be explained by the defendant's delusional state. Rimert's
experts testified that his cooperative and calm demeanor was typical of a
person suffering from paranoid delusions. In addition, Rimert argued that his
remarks to the police regarding how to "get out of this" were reflective of his
inability to grasp reality.2 The court was not persuaded and found that the
evidence was not clearly explainable by the circumstances.'
The essential difference between the evidence offered in Rimert, as
compared to that offered in Hernandez, is that the actions of the accused in
Hernandez were consistent with the nature of the paranoid delusion, whereas
the evidence offered in Rimert was too unrelated to the delusion to be
explained away. The essence of Rimert's argument was that a sane person
would not ask the police how to get out of a quadruple murder, wash off the
murder weapon and wait for the police to arrive, or calmly sit in a chair while
still wearing blood stained clothes. Because, however, the actions observed by
the officers upon arriving at the murder scene were not what one would expect
of a person under a paranoid delusion that he needed to rush to Florida, the
Rimert court was able to distinguish its case from Hernandez.
18. Rimert, __ S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 401.
19. 287 S.C. 183, 336 S.E.2d 476 (1985).
20. Id. at 186, 336 S.E.2d at 477.
21. Record at 174, 220.
22. See Rimert, - S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 401.
[Vol. 47
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss1/6
CRIMINAL LAW
Next, the Rimert court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to
instruct the jury on the effects of the different verdicts the jury could
return.23 The basis of Rimert's objection was his belief that the prosecuting
attorney misled the jury into believing that the "guilty but mentally ill" verdict
would impose a lighter sentence on Rimert than a strictly guilty sentence. The
court determined that an explanation of the consequences of each verdict does
not aid the jury in their function, which is to determine only whether the
defendant committed the offense. The court also held that the trial court's
curative instruction explaining this point to the jury was sufficient to remove
any prejudice.24 This determination is consistent with previous South Carolina
law' and that of numerous other jurisdictions."5
Unlike South. Carolina, some states require that the jury knows the
consequences of a verdict. In Louisiana, for example, an instruction explaining
the consequences of a verdict must be given if requested by the defendant or
the jurors.27 The request must be in writing before the instructions are given
and the court must determine that not giving the instruction would result in "a
miscarriage of justice, prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused, or a
substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right."2s In State v.
Shickles"9 the Supreme Court of Utah considered the precise issue presented
in Rimert. The Shickles court noted that a jury ordinarily does not need to
know the consequences of a guilty verdict because juries usually are limited
to returning a verdict of either guilty or innocent. However, the court stated
that the case before it was different:
The jury was not given an either/or decision; it had to choose one of four
verdicts. To make an intelligent, rational choice, the jury needed an
explanation of those verdicts that were not self-evident. Specifically, the
jury needed to know the consequences of the guilty and mentally ill verdict
and the not guilty by reason of insanity verdict, since they have a less than
obvious meaning and effect. To fulfill the legislative purpose in providing
these two types of verdicts, juries must know the effect the verdicts will
have .... Clearly, "guilty" and "not guilty" verdict forms require no
23. Id. at , 446 S.E.2d at 401.
24. Id. at , 446 S.E.2d at 401 (citing State v. Huiett, 271 S.C. 205, 246 S.E.2d 862
(1978)).
25. See State v. Poindexter,__ S.C. __, __,431 S.E.2d 254, 255 (1993); State v. McGee,
268 S.C. 618, 235 S.E.2d 715 (1977).
26. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 325 S.E.2d 137, 139-40 (Ga. 1985); People v. Ramsey, 375
N.W.2d 297, 304-05 (Mich. 1985).
27. See State v. Leeming, 612 So. 2d 308, 315 (La. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 616 So.
2d 681 (La. 1993).
28. Id. (citing State v. Pettaway, 450 So. 2d 1345 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 456 So. 2d
171 (La. 1984)).
29. 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988).
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special explanations to the jury .... [A] verdict of guilty and mentally ill
is new to our law, and its effect and meaning are not self-evident.
The South Carolina Supreme Court also determined in Rimert that it was
not improper to give the jury the option of choosing between guilty and guilty
but mentally ill verdicts. The court construed section 17-24-30 as requiring a
judge to give the jury the option between guilty, not guilty, not guilty by
reason of insanity, and guilty but mentally ill any time evidence of insanity is
presented.3" Such an interpretation may be a strained reading of the stat-
ute.32 In the statute, the word "must" modifies "verdict." Therefore, "must"
arguably does not require the trial judge to provide all of the options to the
jury, but mandates only that the final verdict be one of the listed four.
Furthermore, a trial judge arguably should be permitted to exclude an option
if there is insufficient evidence to support that specific verdict.
The supreme court put to rest Rimert's argument that since the guilty and
the guilty but mentally ill verdict carried the same sentence, Rimert, as the
defendant, had the option to waive the guilty but mentally ill verdict from
being charged to the jury. By interpreting section 17-24-30 as requiring a court
to submit all four possible verdicts to the jury, the court quickly concluded
that Rimert could not waive the verdict.33
The importance of Rimert lies in its clarification of the burden of
production required by the State in a murder trial where the defendant raises
an insanity defense. In order for evidence to be explainable by the circum-
stances, it must have a sufficient nexus to and specifically coincide with the
paranoid delusions suffered by the accused. However, to say that the evidence
is inconsistent with other evidence that tends to show insanity is not sufficient.
Finally, the court interpreted section 17-24-30 as requiring that courts offer a
30. Id. at 296-97. For a thorough discussion on the various approaches taken by jurisdictions
to deal with this problem, see id. at 296-301.
31. Rimert, _ S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 402.
32. Section 17-24-30 provides:
In a prosecution for a crime when the affirmative defense of insanity is raised
sufficiently by the defendant .. . the trier of fact shall find under the applicable law,
and the verdict must so state, whether the defendant is:
(1) guilty;
(2) not guilty;
(3) not guilty by reason of insanity; or
(4) guilty but mentally ill.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
33. Rimert, _ S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 402. In support of this proposition, the court
relied upon People v. Ritsema, 307 N.W.2d 380 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), where the Michigan
Court of Appeals stated "where the evidence supports an instruction on the defense of insanity,
the instruction on guilty but mentally ill must also be given. The duty imposed upon the trial
judge by the legislature cannot be waived by the defendant." Rilsema, 307 N.W.2d at 385.
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jury confronted with the issue of insanity four verdict options, including the
guilty but mentally ill verdict.
Michael M. Shetterly
III. COURT TAKES STEPS TO CONTROL POTENTIAL
PROSECUTORIAL ABUSE OF STATE GRAND JURY
In State v. Thrift' the South Carolina Supreme Court held that plea
agreements must appear on the record,2 denied the state authorization to
compel testimony by granting "use" immunity,3 and declared that polygraph
evidence is not admissible before South Carolina grand juries.4 The court
also found that the 1991 Ethics Act5 did not entirely repeal previous ethics
provisions.
6
Sam, Tom, Glenn, and Gary Thrift were the principals of Thrift Brothers,
Inc., an Upstate road-paving business qualified to bid with the State Highway
Department. In 1991 the South Carolina Attorney General's office assumed
a discontinued federal investigation of the Thrifts, focusing on allegations that
the Thrifts had given illegal gifts and bribes to highway department officials.'
Although the violations occurred primarily in the Upstate, the Attorney
General believed that the Thrifts' influence in Greenville County would hinder
an attempt to secure convictions there. Consequently, the Attorney General's
office restricted its indictment to charges that could be prosecuted in Horry
county.'
The grand jury indicted Sam Thrift, Tom Thrift, and Herman P. Snyder,
the Chief Highway Engineer, for multiple violations of state law.9 The
parties reached a plea agreement under which all three plead guilty to general
criminal conspiracy. On December 11, 1991, the Attorney General's office
notified the Highway Department in writing that the plea agreement "complet-
1. __ S.C. _, 440 S.E.2d 341 (1994).
2. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 348.
3. Id. at , 440 S.E.2d at 351. But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1760 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1994).
4. Thrift, _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 352.
5. 1991 S.C. Acts 248 (codified as amended in Title 8, Chapter 13, of the South Carolina
Code).
6. Thrift, _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 353-55.
7. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 344.
8. The court expressed concern over the General Attorney's decision, stating that such acts
of discretion could "set a different prosecutorial standard for the powerful or influential, which
tends to undermine the very foundation of justice." Id. at __ n. 1, 440 S.E.2d at 344 n. 1.
9. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 344-45.
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ed its prosecution of Sam Thrift, Tom Thrift, and Herman Snyder. f ° The
letter specified that the Attorney General's office did not "plan to seek
prosecution of any additional individuals."" As part of the plea agreement,
the Thrifts entered into a debarment agreement with the Highway Department
in which they agreed to "assist the Highway Department in any internal
investigations against Highway Department officials for misconduct on
violation of rules and regulations. "12
On May 4, 1992, the amended State Grand Jury Act 3 expanded the
jurisdiction of the State Grand Jury to include crimes involving public
corruption. 4 As a result, then Attorney General Medlock reopened the
Thrift investigation despite the Horry County plea agreement. In July 1992
the Attorney General's office presented findings of the Thrift investigation to
the State Grand Jury, spawning several new indictments."
The proceeding, however, contained irregularities. For example, Sam,
Tom, and Gary Thrift, as well as Rogers Carroll, a Highway Department
official, had testified before the grand jury under grants of immunity.'6 The
same grand jury later indicted each of these witnesses despite the grant of
immunity.17
In addition, John David Gilreath, Sr., a Highway Department official,
testified that he had refused to take a polygraph test. The Chief Deputy
Attorney General then called the polygraph operator to testify. The operator
stated that he advised people not to take the polygraph "if they are going to
have to lie about something.""8 The same grand jury which heard this
testimony indicted Gilreath. 9 On January 22, 1993, the circuit court judge
issued a pretrial order dismissing all indictments on various grounds;. ° the
State appealed.
21
10. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 345.
11. Thrift, __ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 345.
12. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 345.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-7-1600 to -1820 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
14. The expanded jurisdiction includes:
[Any crime, statutory, common law or other, involving public corruption as defined
in Section 14-7-1615, any crime, statutory, common law or other, arising out of or
in connection with a crime involving public corruption as defined in Section 14-7-
1615, and any attempt, aiding, abetting, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit any
crime, statutory, common law or other, involving public corruption ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1630(A)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
15. Thrift, _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 345.
16. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 349.
17. Id. at , 440 S.E.2d at 350.
18. Id. at , 440 S.E.2d at 352.
19. Id. at , 440 S.E.2d at 345.
20. Thrift, - S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 345.
21. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 346.
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Before considering the merits of the appeal, the South Carolina Supreme
Court disposed of two preliminary issues. First, the court defined the scope
of review applicable to pretrial rulings, stating that "'[a]ppellate courts are
bound by fact findings in response to motions preliminary to trial when the
findings are supported by the evidence and not clearly wrong or controlled by
error of law.'" ' Second, the court acknowledged the constraints on judicial
review of prosecutorial actions; this constraint results from the separation of
powers, which vests the executive branch with discretion when exercising the
prosecutorial function. Prosecutors may "decide when and where to present
an indictment, and may even decide whether an indictment should be
sought."' Moreover, prosecutors have the power to plea bargain or to
choose not to prosecute.' The court noted that "the South Carolina Consti-
tution and South Carolina case law place the unfettered discretion to prosecute
solely in the prosecutor's hands. "I The judicial branch may not infringe on
this prosecutorial discretion, but may "review and interpret" the results of its
exercise.26 Justice Toal, writing for the majority, conceded this limitation on
the judicial branch by writing, "[w]hether the plea agreement is wise, or even
in the best interests of the state, is not the question before us."27 The court
then turned to the merits.
The court affirmed the circuit court judge's dismissal of the indictments
against the Thrifts. Although the parties had not reduced the plea agreement
to writing, the court held that oral plea agreements are "perfectly enforce-
able. "28 Consequently, the court found that the plea agreement prevented
further prosecution of the Thrifts and their corporations.29
The court relied on three established rules governing plea agreements.
First, a promise or agreement made by the State that results in a guilty plea
must be enforced.3" Second, the actions of one district attorney encumber the
22. Id. at , 440 S.E.2d at 346 (quoting State v. Amerson, _ S.C. -, -' 428 S.E.2d
871, 873 (1993)).
23. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 346.
24. Id. at , 440 S.E.2d at 347.
25. Thrift, _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 346 (citing S.C. CONST. art. V, § 24 and State ex
rel McLeod v. Snipes, 266 S.C. 415, 223 S.E.2d 853 (1976)).
26. Id. at 440 S.E.2d at 347.
27. Id. at __,440 S.E.2d at 347.
28. Id. at __, 440 S.E.2d at 348.
29. Id. at , 440 S.E.2d at 348-49.
30. Thrift, _ S.C. at __, 440 S.E.2d at 347 (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971) (holding that when a prosecutor's promise or agreement is the significant inducement for
a guilty plea, the agreement must be sustained); United States v. Ringling, 988 F.2d 504 (4th Cir.
1993) (stating that contractual principles undergird plea bargains, and parties to such an
agreement should receive the benefit of the bargain); Baughman v. State, __ S.C. __, 430
S.E.2d 505 (1993) (holding that plea agreements are to be enforced, and that the court may not
imply a term upon which the parties did not agree); and State v. Gates, 299 S.C. 92, 382 S.E.2d
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actions of all other district attorneys." Finally, the government bears the
responsibility for ambiguities in the agreement. 2 Accordingly, the court
concluded that the terms of the Horry County plea agreement bound all
prosecuting authorities in the state, including the Attorney General. 3
The court next considered the scope of the agreement. This inquiry, like
the construction of an ambiguous contract, is a question of law.3 The
Assistant Attorney General's December 1991 letter to the Highway Department
named only Sam Thrift, Tom Thrift, and Herman Snyder as released from
subsequent prosecution. Nonetheless, the court upheld the trial judge's finding
that the underlying plea agreement "prohibited the State from further prosecu-
tion of the Thrifts or their corporations for conspiracy or substantive acts of
bribery of Highway Department officials." 35
Justice Toal reprimanded the State for failing to clarify the plea
agreement:
On the present facts, the State's current dilemma is one of its own
creation. The State had the opportunity to set forth the scope of the
agreement and persons to whom the agreement applied, but did not. We
caution both the bench and bar that this can no longer be an option.36
To prevent ambiguity in future agreements, the court held prospectively that
all plea agreements must appear on the record and must state the scope,
offenses, and individuals involved in the agreement. The court specifically
limited appellate review of plea agreements "to those terms which are fully set
forth in the record. "31
The court's concern for the integrity of the plea bargaining process is
commendable for two reasons. First, resolving criminal charges without a
trial is invaluable to the judicial system.3 The United States Supreme Court
has stated:
[Plea bargaining] leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most
criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness
during pre-trial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial;
886 (1989) (sustaining a plea agreement which proved to be unfavorable to the prosecution)).
31. Id. at __,440 S.E.2d at 347 (citing Ringling, 988 F.2d at 507).
32. Id. at 440 S.E.2d at 347 (citing Ringling, 988 F.2d 504).
33. Id. at __, 440 S.E.2d at 347-48.
34. Id. at , 440 S.E.2d at 347 (citing Baughman v. State, _ S.C. _, 430 S.E.2d 505
(1993); State v. Gates, 299 S.C. 92, 382 S.E.2d 886 (1989)).
35. Thrift, _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 346 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at __, 440 S.E.2d at 347.
37. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 348.
38. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
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it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to
continue criminal conduct even while on pre-trial release; and, by
shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever
may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately
imprisoned. 9
Second, negotiation and performance of a plea agreement implicate
constitutional concerns.' A defendant who enters a guilty plea waives the
rights to remain silent, to be tried by a jury, to confront one's accusers, to call
witnesses, and to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt.41 The
Supreme Court has declared each of these rights to be "fundamental."42
Therefore, while plea bargaining is an indispensable aid to the judicial process,
courts must also protect the rights of the defendant.
The Thrifts and Rogers Carroll asserted that the amended State Grand
Jury Act violated the South Carolina Constitution because the Act allowed the
State to compel testimony upon a grant of mere "use" immunity rather than
the broader "transactional" immunity.' "Transactional immuni-
ty... shields the witness from any prosecution for the transaction or offense
to which his compelled testimony relates."' Use immunity, on the other
hand, "prohibits the witness' compelled testimony and its fruits from being
used in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the
witness."45 The original State Grand Jury Act granted transactional immunity
for testimony compelled after a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege.46 The
1992 amendments reduced the required grant of immunity to "use" and
"derivative use" innunity.
47
The court held that the South Carolina Constitution requires that the
prosecution grant transactional immunity before compelling testimony.4"
39. Id. (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1970)).
40. Id. at 264 (Douglas, J., concurring); United States v. Ringling, 988 F.2d 504, 506 (4th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986); Thrift, _ S.C. at___
440 S.E.2d at 347.
41. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 264 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
42. Id.
43. Thrift, _ S.C. at , 440 S.E.2d at 349-50.
44. Id. at __, 440 S.E.2d at 349 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52
(1964)).
45. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 349 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)).
46. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 351.
47. "[Nbo [compelled] testimony ... or other information [so] produced, or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or such other information, may be received
against him in any criminal action, criminal investigation, or criminal proceeding." S.C. CODE
ANN. § 14-7-1760 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
48. Thrift, _ S.C. at , 440 S.E.2d at 351.
1995]
15
et al.: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1995
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
While the court recognized Kastigar v. United States49 as the controlling case
interpreting the federal Constitution, the court refused to limit the South
Carolina Constitution by accepting the Kastigar analysis.5 0 In Kastigar, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute
authorizing the government to compel testimony by granting use and derivative
use immunity.5 ' The Kastigar court, however, constructed a procedural
safeguard by requiring the government to prove that the evidence used to
procure the indictment is "wholly independent" of the compelled testimony
and its fruits. 52 Despite the availability of this safeguard, the Thrift court
held that the South Carolina Constitution demands broader protection for
compelled testimony. 53 The court reasoned that, despite the procedural safe-
guards, the Kastigar rule did not curtail "[t]he potential for Double Jeopardy
problems in prosecutions of use immunized witnesses and the constitutional
implications of indictments by the same grand jury which heard use immunized
testimony. .... "54
In so holding, the court relied upon an older, "controlling" South
Carolina decision,55 decided on "strikingly similar facts."56 In Ex Parte
Johnson the court had held that anything less than transactional immunity
violated the South Carolina ConstitutionY.5  At the time that Ex parte Johnson
was decided, however, the applicable federal decision was Counselman v.
Hitchcock." In Counselman, the United States Supreme Court held that the
minimum constitutionally guaranteed immunity was transactional immunity. 9
In Ex parte Johnson the court conceded that the Federal Constitution was not
involved.' The federal privilege against self-incrimination was, however,
"identical with the clause on that subject contained in our present State
49. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
50. Thrift, _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 350.
51. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
52. Id. at 460. The resulting procedure has been named the "Kastigar hearing." See, e.g.,
United States v. Harris, 973 F.2d 333, 336 (4th Cir. 1992). The government ordinarily bears
the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, that proffered evidence was derived
from independent sources. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 854 (D.C. Cir.), modified in
part, 920 F.2d 940 (1990) (per curiam), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991).
53. Thrift, _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 351; see Dickerson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., _
S.C. _, 440 S.E.2d 359, 361-62 (1994) (holding that any grant of immunity less than
transactional immunity is unconstitutional) (following Thrift, _ S.C. _, 440 S.E.2d 341).
54. Thrift, _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 350.
55. Exparte Johnson, 187 S.C. 1, 196 S.E. 164 (1938).
56. Thrift, _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 350.
57. Exparte Johnson, 187 S.C. at 12-13, 196 S.E. at 169.
58. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
59. Id. at 585.
60. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not made applicable to the
states until almost thirty years afterExparte Johnson. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
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Constitution."6 Therefore, relying on the United States Supreme Court's
construction of an identical provision, the South Carolina Supreme Court
determined that the privilege against self-incrimination under the South
Carolina Constitution was coextensive with the federal protection.
In 1972, however, the United States Supreme Court in Kastigar explained
that the statute in Counselman had run afoul of the Fifth Amendment not by
failing to grant transactional immunity, but by authorizing the compulsion of
testimony upon a grant of mere use immunity.62 The Court had found use
immunity inadequate because it failed to prevent the use of evidence "derived
from [the] compelled testimony." 63 Therefore, a statute authorizing the
prosecution to compel testimony by granting both use and derivative use
immunity is constitutionally permissible.' Use and derivative use immunity
is "[i]mmunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence
derived directly and indirectly therefrom. . . ."' This protection "prohibits
the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any
respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction
of criminal penalties on the witness."'
After Kastigar, the South Carolina Supreme Court again confronted an
effort to compel testimony against a claim of privilege.67 In Reeves the court
disagreed with the statement that "the S[outh] C[arolina] [privilege against
self-incrimination] provides greater protection than the comparable section of
the U[nited] S[tates] Constitution."6 8 While Reeves did not involve the
testimony of an immunized witness,69 this statement seemed to imply that
South Carolina would be guided by the Supreme Court's Kastigar decision.
Nonetheless, the Thrift court distinguished Reeves and held that the South
Carolina Constitution does afford more protection than the federal Constitu-
tion.7" The amended State Grand Jury Act therefore offended the South
Carolina Constitution by allowing the State to compel testimony without
granting transactional immunity.
The Thrift holding is somewhat surprising because South Carolina courts
ordinarily will not decide a constitutional issue unless the constitutional issue
61. Exparte Johnson, 187 S.C. at 8, 196 S.E. at 167.
62. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449-51 (1972).
63. Id. at 453-54.
64. Id. at 453.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. South Carolina Tax Comm'n v. Reeves, 278 S.C. 658, 300 S.E.2d 916 (1983).
68. Id. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 917.
69. Reeves involved an attempt by an individual partner to invoke the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination on behalf of a partnership. Id. at 659, 300 S.E.2d at 916.
70. Thrift, _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 351.
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is necessary to resolve the case.7 The Thrift court seemingly could have
resolved the case without invalidating the amended State Grand Jury Act.
First, the same State Grand Jury heard the immunized testimony and
indicted the immunized witnesses."2 In this situation, other courts have
imposed a more stringent burden of proof on the government in a Kastigar
hearing.73 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has taken a different
approach, adopting a per se rule which prevents a grand jury from hearing
immunized testimony and subsequently indicting the immunized witness. 74
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals adhered to the Kastigar rule in allowing
the government to compel testimony by granting use and derivative use
immunity. Nonetheless, the court ruled that allowing the same grand jury to
hear the immunized testimony and indict the immunized witness precludes a
finding that the evidentiary source of the indictment was "wholly independent"
of the immunized testimony.75 In the Thrift case, the court acknowledged,
but did not adopt, the Hinton rule76 which would have rendered the constitu-
tional question moot.
Second, the South Carolina Supreme Court could have relied on the
Kastigar rule itself to dismiss the indictments. The compulsion of testimony
requires adequate procedural safeguards, and the current federal safeguard is
the Kastigar hearing. In this hearing, the government bears the burden of
proving that the evidentiary source of the indictment was "wholly indepen-
dent" of the compelled testimony.' The Thrift court could have considered
whether the Kastigar burden had been satisfied. If not, the indictments would
have violated the federal Constitution, thus eliminating the need to examine the
South Carolina Constitution.
The court's failure to employ these escape routes and the opinion's
emphatic language" suggest that the court was seeking to curb the power of
71. See, e.g., Thorne v. Seabrook, 264 S.C. 503, 216 S.E.2d 177 (1975); Hampton v.
Dodson, 240 S.C. 532, 126 S.E.2d 564 (1962); Heyward v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 240
S.C. 347, 126 S.E.2d 15 (1962).
72. Thrift, __ S.C. at__, 440 S.E.2d at 351.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Garrett, 797 F.2d 656, 662-64 (8th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Zielezinski, 740 F.2d 727, 734 (9th Cir. 1984).
74. Unites States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976), 430
U.S. 982 (1977). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals premised this rule on the view that
'where the indictment is returned by the same grand jury which heard the defendant's immunized
testimony, it would be virtually impossible for the Government to show that it had an independent
source" for the indictment. Id. at 1007.
75. Id. at 1008-09.
76. Thrift, __ S.C. at _ n.10, 440 S.E.2d at 350-51 n.10.
77. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
78. "Mhe rule in Ex parte Johnson is sound and quite necessary to protect the tenets of the
South Carolina Constitution. Where the government compels a witness to incriminate himself,
then by constitutional necessity, the government must do so at its own peril." Thrift, __ S.C.
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the State Grand Jury. Despite the availability of less drastic remedies to the
prosecutorial conduct in Thrift, the court chose to fashion a rule designed to
prevent reoccurrence of perceived abuses of prosecutorial power.
The court next struck down Gilreath's indictment, holding that the
evidence about polygraphing was both inadmissible and prejudicial. The court
stated that, while evidence about polygraphing is clearly inadmissible at
trial, 79 the admissibility of such evidence before a South Carolina grand jury
was a novel issue.80 A grand jury proceeding is less formal than a trial, and
the procedural and evidentiary safeguards available to a defendant at trial may
not be available in a grand jury proceeding."1 The United States Supreme
Court has limited the constitutional protections afforded to the target of a
grand jury investigationY Therefore, despite the compelling arguments
against admission of polygraph evidence at trial, there are convincing
arguments for the admission of such evidence before the grand jury. State
courts have split on this issue.83
In considering the remedy for the introduction of evidence about
polygraphing, the court noted that, "[o]rdinarily, [courts] do not inquire into
the nature or sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury. "8 If, however,
the defendant makes a colorable claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the court
will inquire into the legitimacy of the indictment.85 Where there is a
colorable claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the court must determine (1)
whether there was such misconduct, and, if so, (2) whether the misconduct so
prejudiced the proceeding that the indictment should be dismissed.86
at _, 440 S.E.2d at 351.
79. Id. at __, 440 S.E.2d at 352 (citing State v. Pressley, 290 S.C. 251, 349 S.E.2d 403
(1986)); accord State v. McGuire, 272 S.C. 547, 253 S.E.2d 103 (1979) (per curiam).
80. Thrift, _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 352.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Overmyer, 899 F.2d 457, 465 (6th Cir. 1990) (exercising
"extreme caution in dismissing an indictment for alleged grand jury misconduct"); United States
v. Kouba, 822 F.2d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[t]he remedy for dismissal of an
indictment due to grand jury abuse is appropriate only up'on actual prejudice to the accused").
82. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (holding that the prosecution's failure
to produce substantial exculpatory evidence in a grand jury proceeding does not necessitate
dismissal of the indictment); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (holding that a
witness before a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they result
from evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359
(1956) (holding that hearsay evidence is sufficient to support a grand jury indictment).
83. Thrift, _ S.C. at ,440 S.E.2d at 352. Compare State v. Woodson, 551 A.2d 1187
(R.I. 1988); People v. Frank, 422 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct. 1979) with In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 791 F. Supp. 192 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
84. Thrift, _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 352 (citing State v. Williams, 301 S.C. 369, 392
S.E.2d 181 (1990) (per curiam) and State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290, 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974)).
85. Id. at __, 440 S.E.2d at 352.
86. Id. at , 440 S.E.2d at 352-53.
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The court first addressed the issue of prosecutorial misconduct. In South
Carolina, such a claim is difficult to establish.' In Thrift, the trial court
found that the prosecution had behaved improperly. The supreme court,
however, reversed this finding.8 s  The court justified the reversal by
observing that the admissibility of evidence about polygraphing before the
grand jury was a novel issue. 9 In the words of Justice Toal, "the Attorney
General and the.Attorney General's staff handled the Thrift matter in complete
good faith and in accord with the highest of ethical and professional stan-
dards."9°
Despite the absence of demonstrated prosecutorial misconduct, the court
addressed the possibility that the prosecution's conduct prejudiced the
proceeding. Dismissing an indictment for non-constitutional error is appropri-
ate only if the evidence "substantially influenced" the grand jury, or if "there
is grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from substantial influence
of such violations. "91 Applying this standard, the court found that the
introduction of evidence about polygraphing severely prejudiced the proceed-
ing and justified dismissal. 92
As with its reaction to the immunity issue, the court adopted an extreme
remedy for a moderate violation. First, the procedural and evidentiary
safeguards at trial are not necessarily available in grand jury proceedings. 3
Second, dismissal of an indictment for a violation of non-constitutional
proportions is a relatively drastic remedy.' Once again, the court seems to
have been primarily focused on the potential abuse of the power of the State
Grand Jury.
The court next addressed the third major issue before it, holding that
Article 7 of the Ethics, Government Accountability, and Campaign Reform
Act of 199111 did not impliedly repeal the "old" Ethics Act.' Although it
listed several applicable rules of statutory construction, the court rested its
conclusion on the rule that "legislative intent must prevail if it can be
87. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 352.
88. Id. at_, 440 S.E.2d at 353.
89. Thrift, _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 353.
90. Id. at_, 440 S.E.2d at 353.
91. Id. at-, 440 S.E.2d at 353 (citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250
(1988)).
92. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 353.
93. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
94. The "harmless error rule" prohibits dismissal of an indictment unless the proceedingswere
substantially prejudiced by the non-constitutional violation. See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v.
United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988); United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986).
95. 1991 S.C. Acts 248 (codified as amended in Title 8, Chapter 13, of the South Carolina
Code).
96. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-490 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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reasonably discovered in the language used as it is construed in the light of the
intended purpose."' The court found that because the new Ethics Act
unambiguously states that the legislative intent was to amend, not to repeal,
the old Ethics Act, 98 the old Ethics Act remains viable law.'
Finally, the court held that the indicted Highway Department officials
were "public officials" subject to prosecution for misconduct in office."°
A public official is "one who is charged with exercising some sovereign power
in the performance of his duties"'0 ' or one with a duty to the public.' °1
The court found that the duties of the indicted Highway Department officials
were of great concern to the public 3 and, accordingly, held that Highway
Department officials were subject to prosecution for misconduct in office.
The signal sent by the court in Thrift is clear: "A grand jury is not a
prosecutor's plaything, and the awesome power of the State should not be
abused but should be used deliberately, not in haste."" ° As the court noted
in its opinion, "[t]he grand jury is more than a mere instrument of the
prosecution."" An unwillingness to ignore possible violations of prosecuto-
rial authority, particularly before an increasingly powerful State Grand Jury,
obviously animated the Thrift court. In an effort to control potential abuse of
the State Grand Jury, the court held that the prosecution must respect plea
agreements, and that such plea agreements must appear on the record; that the
prosecution must grant transactional immunity in order to compel testimony
from recalcitrant witnesses; and that polygraph evidence is inadmissible before
South Carolina grand juries. These holdings will close potential avenues for
prosecutorial abuse of the State Grand Jury.
B. Eric Shytle
IV. MENS REA OF KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED
UNDER KIDNAPPING STATUTE
In State v. Jefferies' the South Carolina Supreme Court sought to
determine what, if any, mens rea, or required mental state, is necessary under
97. Thrift, __ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 354.
98. Id. at , 440 S.E.2d at 354.
99. Id. at , 440 S.E.2d at 355.
100. Id. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 356.
101. Id. at, 440 S.E.2d at 356 (citing Sanders v. Belue, 78 S.C. 171, 58 S.E. 762 (1907)).
102. Thrift, _ S.C. at _, 440 S.E.2d at 356.
103. Id. at -, 440 S.E.2d at 356.
104. State v. Capps, 276 S.C. 59, 61, 275 S.E.2d 872, 873 (1981).
105. Thrift, _ S.C. at __ n.15, 440 S.E.2d at 353 n.15.
1. _ S.C. _, 446 S.E.2d 427 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 911 (1995).
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the South Carolina kidnapping statute.2 The court held that, although the
statute makes no explicit mention of a mens rea requirement, the legislature
intended to require a mental state of at least "knowledge" for kidnapping in
South Carolina. 3
On November 25, 1988, the defendant (Jefferies) escaped from a youth
detention center in Richland County and looked for an automobile to aid his
escape. At the same time, Ronald Caldwell (Caldwell) left his car with the
motor running, and with his four-month old son inside, in the parking lot of
a convenience store while he went to get change to use a pay telephone. As
Jefferies got in the car and began to pull out of the parking lot, Caldwell ran
to the moving car, held onto the window, and pleaded for the release of his
son. Jefferies admitted that he looked around the car and noticed the infant
as Caldwell was pleading for his son's release. Nevertheless, Jefferies picked
up speed and headed toward the interstate until Caldwell eventually let go of
the car. Later that night, when Jefferies was apprehended, he told the police
he left the infant next to a garbage dumpster more than twenty miles from
where he stole the car.4
At his trial, Jefferies claimed he was not guilty of kidnapping because he
did not possess the requisite intent to kidnap.5 The trial judge charged the
jury with the South Carolina kidnapping statute and the additional element of
a "positive act. "6 The jury found Jefferies guilty. Jefferies appealed the trial
judge's failure to define a "positive act" and failure to charge intent as an
element of kidnapping. 7 His appeal ultimately reached the United States
Supreme Court.8 The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of
appeals, which granted Jefferies a new trial.9 The South Carolina Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld the conviction, holding that
Jefferies possessed the requisite mens rea of knowledge.'I
At the time this case came to trial, the South Carolina kidnapping statute
provided:
Whoever shall unlawfully seize, confine, inveigle, decoy, kidnap, abduct
or carry away any other person by any means whatsoever without authority
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-910 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (amended 1991).
3. Jefferies, _ S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 430-31.
4. Id. at __, 446 S.E.2d at 428.
5. Id. at __, 446 S.E.2d at 429.
6. Id. at __, 446 S.E.2d at 429.
7. See State v. Jefferies, 304 S.C. 141, 403 S.E.2d 169 (Ct. App. 1991) (upholding the trial
court's ruling).
8. See Jefferies v. South Carolina, 112 S. Ct. 1464 (1992).
9. State v. Jefferies, 308 S.C. 414, 415, 418 S.E.2d 339, 340 (Ct. App. 1992), rev'd,
S.C. __, 446 S.E.2d 427 (1994).
10. Jefferies, _ S.C. at __, _ 446 S.E.2d at 429, 433.
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of law, except when a minor is seized or taken by a parent thereof, shall
be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall suffer the punishment of
life imprisonment unless sentenced for murder as provided in
§ 16-3-20."
The statute does not expressly state what, if any, mens rea is required to
sustain a conviction for kidnapping. Therefore, the South Carolina Supreme
Court looked to the history and development of the statute to determine if the
legislature intended the crime to require a particular mens rea element, or if
the legislature intended that kidnapping be a crime of strict liability.12
The Jefferies court began its analysis by examining the language of the
original kidnapping statute.' 3 The court reasoned that even though no mens
rea was explicitly stated in the original statute, the use of the word "procure"
implied taking possession of a minor "with some degree of effort or knowl-
edge."" In 1937 the statute was amended to add the requirement of holding
the person for ransom or reward.' 5 The court reasoned that the addition of
this element indicated legislative intent to increase the required mental state to
one of "purpose."16 However, the deletion of the reward or ransom
requirement in 197611 revealed that the legislature clearly intended to lower
the required culpable state of mind. Additionally, the court found no evidence
of any legislative intent to make kidnapping a crime of strict liability.' 8
Therefore, having found legislative intent to establish a lower mens rea
requirement than purpose, but a higher requirement than strict liability, the
court determined that the requisite mens rea for kidnapping in South Carolina
is knowledge.' 9 Having determined that a defendant must have knowledge
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-910 (Law. Co-op. 1985). This statute was amended in 1991 to
decrease the maximum penalty to imprisonment for thirty years, unless the defendant is sentenced
for murder. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-910 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994).
12. Jefferies, _ S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 430. A crime of strict liability is one that
requires no element of intent or fault. State v. Ferguson, 302 S.C. 269, 272, 395 S.E.2d 182,
183 (1990).
13. The original statute provided:
That if any person shall procure and carry without the limits of the State any minor
or person under the age of twenty-one years, without the consent of the parents or
guardian of such minor, such person shall, upon convictionthereof, be fined in a sum
not less than one hundred, nor more than five hundred dollars, or be imprisoned in
the Penitentiary of the State for a period of not less than one year.
1871 S.C. Acts 324 § 2.
14. Jefferies, - S.C. at __ n.5, 446 S.E.2d at 430 n.5.
15. 1937 S.C. Acts 106.
16. Jefferies, _ S.C. at __, 446 S.E.2d at 430.
17. See 1976 S.C. Acts 684.
18. Jefferies, _ S.C. at __, 446 S.E.2d at 430.
19. Id. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 430-31.
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of the kidnapping, the court affirmed Jefferies' conviction based on his
admission that he was aware of the infant's presence in the car and continued
to drive away.2
In upholding the conviction, the court stated that "'[c]riminal liability is
normally based upon the concurrence of two factors, "an evil meaning mind
[and] an evil doing hand.' "21 The court cited United States v. Bailey for
the proposition that "[tihe required mens rea for a particular crime can be
classified into a hierarchy of culpable states of mind in descending order of
culpability, as purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.'!' This
approach follows the Model Penal Code, which rejects the common-law
classification of crimes as requiring either general or specific intent.24 The
Bailey court expounded on the hierarchy by elaborating on the distinction
between "purpose" and "knowledge." A person acts purposefully if "'he
consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening
from his conduct,' while he is said to act knowingly if he is aware 'that that
result is practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire
may be as to that result.' "1 The Court then stated that the distinction
between purpose and knowledge is of little importance with most crimes
because there is usually sufficient reason to find guilt when a person possesses
the lesser culpable mental state of knowledge.' In making this distinction,
the Bailey court recognized that there was only a narrow class of crimes that
require the heightened culpability of purpose.27
South Carolina previously recognized this hierarchy of culpability in State
v. Ferguson.28 In that case, the defendant was charged with bribing a police
officer and distributing cocaine. The supreme court considered whether the
trial court properly charged the jury on the mental state required to be
convicted of those crimes. The court recognized the hierarchy of culpable
states of mind and then held that the determination of which mental state is
applicable to a particular crime is a question of legislative intent. 29 Because
20. Id. at __, 446 S.E.2d at 433.
21. Id. at_, 446 S.E.2d at 430 (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402 (1980)).
22. 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
23. Jefferies, _ S.C. at __, 446 S.E.2d at 430.
24. Id. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 430; see also WAYNe R. LAFAVE & AusrIN N. ScOTT, JR.,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 28 (1972) (providing a detailed discussion of the distinction
between intent/purpose and knowledge).
25. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 422,
445 (1978) (quoting LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 24, § 28, at 196)).
26. Id. at 404 (quoting United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 445 (quoting LAFAVE &
ScOTT, supra note 24, § 28, at 197)).
27. Id. at 405. The Court listed murder, treason, and conspiracy as examples of crimes that
require a mental state of purpose.
28. 302 S.C. 269, 271, 395 S.E.2d 182, 183 (1990).
29. Id. at 271-72, 395 S.E.2d at 183.
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the statutes involved in Ferguson did not expressly indicate what, if any,
mental state was required, the court sought to determine legislative intent
through an analysis of the common law and through statutory interpretation.3"
The court's method of determining the required mens rea for the elements
of a particular criminal statute containing no express requirement is consistent
with the analysis previously employed in Ferguson. As in Ferguson, the court
determined legislative intent through statutory construction and a review of the
statute's legislative history.3" The Jefferies court then applied the definitions
of purpose and knowledge from Bailey to the South Carolina kidnapping
statute.
32
Other jurisdictions have also employed similar methodology to determine
the required mens rea for a particular crime when the statute is silent
regarding state of mind. In Wagerman v. Indiana3 the Indiana Court of
Appeals followed an approach similar to the one used in Jefferies to determine
the required mens rea for a statute dealing with the alteration of handgun
identification marks.34 In Wagerman the defendant was convicted for
possession of a handgun with an altered serial number.35 The Indiana statute
had no express or implied mens rea requirement. 36  Both at trial and on
appeal, Wagerman argued that the State was required to show that he knew the
serial numbers had been altered.37 The court of appeals held that when
construing a criminal statute with no express mens rea requirement, "'criminal
intent has generally been viewed as a presumptive element in criminal
offenses.' " 3  The court then set forth a list of factors to determine whether
criminal intent is an essential element of a given crime. The factors are:
1) the legislative history, title or context of a criminal statute;
2) similar or related statutes;
30. Id. at 272, 395 S.E.2d at 183.
31. Jefferies, _ S.C. at __, 446 S.E.2d at 430-31.
32. Id. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 431.
33. 597 N.E.2d 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
34. Id. at 15.
35. Id. at 14.
36. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-2-18 (Burns 1994). The statute provides:
No person shall:
(1) Change, alter, remove, or obliterate the name of the maker, model,
manufacturer's serial number, or other mark of identification on any handgun; or
(2) Possess any handgun on which the name of the maker, model, manufacturer's
serial number, or other mark of identification has been changed, altered, removed,
or obliterated ....
Id. At trial, the defendant in Wagerman was convicted under subsection (2) of this statute. See
Wagerman, 597 N.E.2d at 15.
37. Wagerman, 597 N.E.2d at 15.
38. Id. (quoting Indiana v. Keihn, 542 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Ind. 1989)).
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3) the severity of punishment (greater penalties favor a culpable
mental state requirement);
4) the danger to the public of prohibited conduct (greater danger
reduces the need for a culpable mental state requirement);
5) the defendant's opportunity to ascertain the operative facts and
avoid the prohibited conduct;
6) the prosecutor's difficulty in proving the defendant's mental
state; and
7) the number of expected prosecutions (greater numbers suggest
that a crime does not require a culpable mental state).3 9
The court held that it would presume a required mental state unless a review
of the factors decisively indicated that the legislature did not intend to make
criminal intent an essential element of the crime.4"
The Supreme Court of New Mexico made a similar presumption in
Santillanes v. New Mexico.4 In Santillanes the court was confronted with
defining the mens rea element in the state child abuse statute. The court
stated:
When a criminal statute is silent about whether a mens rea element is
required, we do not assume that the legislature intended to enact a no-fault
or strict liability crime. Instead, it is well settled that we presume criminal
intent as an essential element of the crime unless it is clear from the statute
that the legislature intended to omit the mens rea element.42
Applying this analysis, the court held that criminal negligence was the required
mens rea under the New Mexico child abuse statute.43
Although the approaches applied in Wagernan and Jefferies are similar
in that they both look to the intent of the legislature to determine if there is a
required state of mind for a particular crime, there are nevertheless some
subtle differences in how the two courts determine legislative intent. Indiana
begins with a presumption that the legislature intended criminal intent to be an
essential element of the crime, while South Carolina has not expressly held
that there is such a presumption." In addition, Indiana employs a seven-
factor analysis to determine if the presumption of criminal intent can be
39. Id. (quoting Keihn, 542 N.E.2d at 967 (citing 1 LAFAvE & Scorr, SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW, § 3.8, at 342-44 (1986))).
40. Id.
41. 849 P.2d 358, 361 (N.M. 1993).
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 365.
44. See Jefferies, _ S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 430.
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overcome.45  South Carolina, on the other hand, uses only the traditional
canons of statutory construction and legislative history to determine the intent
of the legislature.46
Jefferies, in addition to establishing that a person charged with kidnapping
must at least possess a mental state of knowledge in order to be found guilty,
reiterated the methodology that courts in this state should employ to determine
the required mens rea for elements of a particular crime when the statute is
silent regarding mental state. Specifically, courts should use the traditional
canons of statutory interpretation and examine legislative history to determine
if the legislature intended the crime to require a particular mental state, or if
the intent was to make the crime one of strict liability. Finally, Jefferies
reaffirms that South Carolina has embraced the hierarchy of culpable states of
mind contained in the Model Penal Code.
Jonathan P. Weitz
45. See Wagerman, 597 N.E.2d at 15.
46. See Jefferies, _ S.C. at _, 446 S.E.2d at 430.
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